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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffTRespondent,

LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS,

CaseNo.20001049-SC

Defendant/Petitioner.

Priority No. 13

POINT I. WEEKSy REQUEST FOR APPELLATE REVIEW ON THE
MERITS IS SUPPORTED BY THE RESUSCITATION RULE,1
In response to Weeks1 arguments before this Court, the state asserts the following:
M

The general rule in criminal cases is that a defendant waives all claims which he does not

1

In the opening Brief of Petitioner, Weeks argued at Point I that assuming arguendo he
failed to timely object to the restitution order in the trial court, that court entertained his
objections and arguments and ruled on the merits of the matter. Thus, Weeks' arguments on
appeal were properly preserved, and the court of appeals erred in failing to address them on
the merits. See Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review, Argument, Point I. Resolution of
that issue is pivotal to Weeks1 case. The state has responded to that argument at Point II of
its brief. See State's Brief of Respondent ("State's Brief).
Thereafter, Weeks argued at Point II of the opening brief that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(e) (Supp. 1998 & 1999) should be interpreted to comport with policy considerations
and due process. See Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review. The state has responded to
that argument at Point I of its Brief. See State's Brief.
While Weeks' Point II is important, this Court may resolve the pivotal issue in this
case by reaching the merits of Weeks' arguments as set forth in Point I. Thus, in this Reply
Brief of Petitioner, Weeks has prioritized the issues as he did in the opening Brief of
Petitioner: Point I herein corresponds with Point I in Weeks' opening Brief (Point II in the
State's Brief), while Point II herein corresponds with Point II in Weeks' opening Brief (Point
I in the State's Brief).
1

timely raise." (State's Brief at 15.) Weeks does not take issue with that general statement.
The state also asserts that if a defendant fails to make a timely objection and a timely
request in the trial court, the trial court is not obligated to reach the merits of defendant's
objection. (See State's Brief at 21.) Under certain circumstances, that may be correct.
See Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
cert, denied 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995) (trial court "simply denied" untimely motion rather
than addressing the merits).
While Weeks does not take issue in this Point I with the state's general arguments and
assertions identified above, Weeks maintains that those arguments are irrelevant. In this
case, Weeks objected to restitution and requested a hearing. The trial court granted Weeks'
request by order dated September 30,1999, and scheduled the hearing for October 18 (Case
Nos. 2830:37-39; 3049:41-43; 3239:39-41). Thereafter, during the hearing, the judge
entertained defense counsel's arguments, reviewed the record and statements in the
presentence report, and issued a ruling that restitution was "fair and reasonable." (R. 60:3-7.)
Thus, this case is governed by the resuscitation rule.
According to the law in this jurisdiction, if a trial court entertains an untimely request
or objection and rules on the substance of the objection, the matter is deemed to be properly
preserved. The trial court's consideration of the issue on the merits resuscitates the issue
under the preservation doctrine for purposes of appeal. (Weeks' Brief of Petitioner on
Certiorari Review, Point I); State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150,1161 (Utah 1991) (if the trial
court has taken the opportunity to address even an untimely claim of error, the justification
2

for arigidwaiver requirement is weakened considerably); State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862, 870
(Utah 1993) (concluding that when an issue is raised in an untimely motion and the court
addresses the issue on the merits, defendants right to assert the issue on appeal is
resuscitated), cert denied. 510 U.S. 865 (1993); State v. Belgard. 830 P.2d 264,266 (Utah
1992) (holding that when a judge considers an untimely claim, defendant's waiver is
effectively waived by the judge); State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991)
(same); State v. Parker. 872 P.2d 1041,1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that "trial court
acted on the merits of the motion and thus de facto considered it timely"), cert, denied. 883
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).2
The state claims the resuscitation rule does not apply here. According to the state,
even if the trial court granted a late request for a restitution hearing, entertained counsel's
objections and arguments at the hearing, then ruled that restitution was fair and reasonable,
that did not constitute a ruling "on the merits" for purposes of the resuscitation rule
"[b]ecause the trial court did not take evidence" on the matter. (State's Brief at 23-24.) The
state's argument is misplaced. Indeed, it was not necessary for the trial court here to "take
evidence" in order for its ruling to constitute a determination on the merits under the
resuscitation rule. It is sufficient that the trial court ruled on the substance of Weeks' claims,
rather than finding waiver. Utah case law supports such a determination.

2

Weeks has argued that in the context of this case, the justification for a rigid waiver
doctrine serves no legitimate purpose. (See Weeks' Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review,
at 20-23.)
3

In State v.Beason. 2000 UT App 109, ^[15,2 P.3d 459, the court of appeals ruled the
issues were properly preserved under the resuscitation doctrine, where the defendant's
untimely motion was argued to and denied by the trial court. LI
In State v.Matsamas. 808 P.2d at 1053, this Court ruled that the untimely evidentiary
objections were properly preserved where the trial judge simply considered the substance of
the objections and ruled on them. Id
In State v. Parker, 872 P.2d at 1043-44, the court of appeals determined that a trial
court's ruling on the substance of defendant's untimely motion constituted action "on the
merits of the motion" and thus a "de facto" determination that the motion was timely. Id.;
see also Seale, 853 P.2d at 870 ("Because the court considered the alleged error rather than
finding it waived, Seale's right to assert the issue on appeal was resuscitated.").
In this case, Weeks requested a hearing on restitution 11 days after sentencing. The
trial judge granted that request and scheduled the matter for October 18, 1999. At the
hearing, Weeks specifically asked the trial court for the opportunity to review documentation
supporting the restitution amount. (R. 60:5-7 (counsel requested opportunity to review
factual and evidentiary basis for restitution amounts).) Weeks also objected to the trial
court's reliance on double hearsay statements as the basis for the restitution award. (R. 60:5,
6, 7 (counsel argued that statements in the presentence report were insufficient to support
award)); see State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (cites omitted) (double
hearsay statements in report may not serve as a sole basis for imposing sentence); State v.
Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (constitution requires judge to act on reliable,
4

relevant information in sentencing): see also State v. Lipsky. 608 P.2d 1241,1248-49 (Utah
1980); State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982).
In connection with Weeks' arguments and objections, the trial court engaged in
discussion with counsel on the merits, "entertained" argument, invited further comment (R.
60), then ruled that restitution was fair and reasonable based on a review of the presentence
investigation report, the "arguments of counsel," the circumstances, and the state's burden
of proof. (R.60:7.)
While the trial court's ruling in this matter lacked fundamental fairness and an
adequate evidentiary basis, it nevertheless constituted a decision on the merits. The ruling
was sufficient to support application of the resuscitation rule.
In support of the state's argument that the trial court in this case failed to reach a
decision on the merits, the state has cited to Covington. 888 P.2d at 678-79 & n.6. (State's
Brief at 24.) That case is distinguishable. As set forth in Weeks' opening Brief of Petitioner
on Certiorari Review, the defendant in Covington filed a post-summary-judgment motion to
alter or amend that the trial court "simply denied" without any hearing or argument.
Covington. 888 P.2d at 678 n.5. Covington is not applicable here. In Weeks' case, Judge
Frederick held a hearing on the restitution issues and ruled on the substance of Weeks'
claims. (See Weeks' Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review, at 19-22); Beason, 2000 UT
App 109, ^ 14 (recognizing that under Covington, party's post-summary judgment motion was
not preserved for appeal where trial court simply denied motion without further proceedings).

5

Inasmuch as the trial court addressed Weeks1 arguments on the merits, the court of
appeals erred in finding waiver. State v. Weeks. 2000 UT 273, lfijlO-12,12 P.3d 110. Weeks
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the court of appeals1 ruling and remand the case
to the trial court for a full hearing on restitution. (Weeks' Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari
Review, Point I.)
POINT II.
THE STATED ARGUMENT REGARDING THE
INTERPRETATION OF § 76-3-201(4)(e) IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE LAW.
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION OF $ 76-3-20 l(4Ye) IS
NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING
THAT PROVISION.
Point II on certiorari review concerns interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(e) (Supp. 1998 & 1999). According to that provision, if defendant objects to
restitution, "the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the
issue." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e).
In the underlying opinion to this case, the court of appeals interpreted that provision
to require a defendant either to make a request for a full restitution hearing "at or before
sentencing," or to waive his rights to the hearing and to due process in the matter. Weeks,
2000 UTApp 273,1fi|9-10.
The plain language of the statute does not support the court of appeals1 rigid
interpretation.
Indeed, the plain language of the provision serves to accommodate a defendant's due
process rights. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(e) (trial court "shall" allow "full hearing" on
6

restitution issues): see State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 715-16 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (identifying defendant's right to examine and present evidence at an evidentiary hearing on
restitution under § 76-3-20l(4)(e)); Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^[8 (recognizing due process
rights in sentencing); see also State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994)
(" [fundamental principles ofprocedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant have
the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information
upon which his sentence is based11); Howell, 707 P.2d at 118 (sentencing judge must act on
reliable, relevant information in sentencing); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,389 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997); Utah Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; (Weeks1 Brief of Petitioner
on Certiorari Review, Point LA.).
Since § 76-3 -201 (4)(e) arguably lends itselfto more than one alternative interpretation
(the court of appeals1 interpretation relates to rigid time constraints on a defendant who
objects to restitution, while an alternative interpretation ensures the trial court's obligation
to provide a full hearing with due process protections), this Court should interpret the
provision in accordance with the policy considerations underlying the provision. See State
v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^7-8,427 Utah Adv. Rep. 35. To that end, as set forth in the opening
Brief of Petitioner and below, § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) should be interpreted to support due process.
B.
WEEKS' PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE IS
CONSISTENT WITH POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, PRACTICES IN THIS
JURISDICTION, DUE PROCESS, AND CASE LAW.
As set forth in the opening Brief of Petitioner, Weeks is urging this Court to construe

7

§ 76-3-201 (4)(e) in accordance with the policy considerations underlying the provision. See
Ostler, 2001UT 68,1HJ7-8 (where statute could reasonably be interpreted in one of two ways,
court will consider relevant policy considerations and legislative history for interpretation).3
Specifically, Weeks has asked this Court to construe § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) as directory and not
mandatory in terms of time restrictions, and to allow defendant a "reasonable time" after
sentencing to request a restitution hearing. (Weeks1 Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review,
Point II.)

3

With respect to the "legislative history," in 1979 the legislature first enacted the
restitution provisions at issue in Weeks' case. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1979),
Compiler's Notes. (A copy of the provision enacted in 1979 is attached hereto as Addendum
A.) The subpart at issue herein was discussed in the January 25, 1979 legislative session,
wherein the sponsoring legislator stated the following: "We're preserving some due process
rights where if the criminal objects to the imposition [of restitution], he may have a full
hearing, and with the benefit of counsel, state those objections and make a determination
there." Utah H.B. 6 (January 25, 1979) (Statements of Representative Selleneit).
Significantly, in enacting the provision, the legislature did not indicate an intent to impose
rigid time constraints on "the criminal." (For this Court's convenience, a transcript of the
legislative discussion relating to the provision is attached hereto as Addendum B.)
In connection with the 1979 amendments, Representative Selleneit also made
reference to an Oregon statute. "[This bill] is based on an Oregon statute . . ."
See Addendum B at 1. The current Oregon statute on restitution is distinguishablefromthe
Utah statute. The Oregon statute provides that if defendant's crime resulted in pecuniary
damages, defendant is entitled to "evidence" supporting the nature and amount of the
damages. The "evidence" "shall" be based on an investigation by the district attorney and
either contained in the presentence report or presented by the district attorney "prior to or at
the time of sentencing." Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.106(1); see also kL § 137.106(4) (if defendant
objects, he may be heard on the matter).
The Utah statute does not require the prosecution to investigate and present
"evidence" supporting restitution prior to sentencing. Rather, restitution awards in Utah are
based on "recommendations." Thereafter, if defendant objects to the restitution amount after
it is "imposed," he is entitled to due process and a full evidentiary hearing on the matter at
a later date. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e); see infra, discussion herein at text, page 10.
8

The "reasonable time" interpretation is appropriate for many reasons: First, it satisfies
due process and avoids constitutional problems. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (in
connection with objections on restitution, trial court "shall" allow defendant a "full hearing"
on the matter); Utah H.B. 6 (January 25,1979) (Statements of Representative Selleneit) (due
process is preserved with "full hearing" provision); Stames, 841 P.2d at 715-16 (interpreting
§ 76-3-20l(4)(e) to ensure due process in restitution hearings); Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ffl|7-8
(if statute is capable of more than one interpretation, court will look to policy considerations
underlying provision); see also State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24, 1J6, 980 P.2d 191 (court
construes statute in favor of constitutionality); In the Interest of Clatterbuck. 700 P.2d 1076,
1079 (Utah 1985) (court interprets statute to avoid due process concerns); Casarez. 656 P.2d
at 1008 (to avoid due process conflicts, Court interprets sentencing statute to require trial
court to disclose presentence investigation report to defendant prior to sentencing).
That is, the interpretation set forth in Weeks1 Brief of Petitioner accommodates
reasonableness and fundamental fairness, where a "reasonable time" component would
provide defendant with an opportunity to investigate the need for a restitution hearing after
proper notice of the matter at sentencing. (Weeks1 Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review,
Point II (strict adherence to § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) fails to accommodate investigation into the
issues and into the need for a hearing on the matter)); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,
1028 n.9 (Utah 1996) (restitution hearing may be held after appropriate notice to defendant
and after defendant has had access to materials); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211
(Utah 1983) (to be proper and adequate, notice must provide party with the opportunity "to
9

be heard in a meaningful way"); see also State v. Dominguez. 1999 UT App 343, Iff3-5,992
P.2d 995, (sentencing hearing was held in April 1998, objection filed in May 1998,
restitution hearing held in September 1998); Ostler. 2001 UT 68, f 10 (construing rule to
provide defendant with 30 days after sentencing to seek withdrawal of a plea in order to
accommodate proper investigation into the matter and to avoid constitutional problems).
Second, the "reasonable time" interpretation would be consistent with current
practices in the trial courts. As set forth in the opening Brief of Petitioner, a defendant is first
notified of "recommended" restitution amounts three days before sentencing. (Weeks1 Brief
of Petitioner on Certiorari Review, at 24-25 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(b)(ii),
(6)(a) (1999)).) Thereafter, at sentencing, defendant is notified for the first time of the
specific amount the trial judge intends to impose. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4). At that
point in the proceedings defendant has not been given sufficient opportunity to prepare for
a full hearing on the matter or to gather or examine evidence relating to restitution. (Weeks1
Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review, Point II.)
If defendant objects to the imposition of restitution, it is the practice in the trial courts
to schedule a hearing on the matter for months after sentencing, apparently to accommodate
crowded calendars, the attendance of third party witnesses, and further investigation. (See
State's Brief at 12-13 ("as a matter of course" trial courts schedule restitution hearings for
later dates)); see also Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343,1fl[3-5 (sentencing hearing was held in
April 1998, objection filed in May 1998, restitution hearing held in September 1998); but
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (trial court "shall" hold "full hearing" "at the time of
10

sentencing11). Thus, the "reasonable time" component would comport with the routine
practices of the trial court.
Third, Weeks1 proposed interpretation is consistent with this Court's interpretation of
other sentencing provisions. State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794,797 (Utah 1977) (construing the
mandatory time restrictions set forth in Section 77-35-1 to provide the sentencing court with
a "reasonable time" in which to complete sentencing); Statev.Tyree, 2000 UT App 350, f 15,
17 P.3d 587 (same), cert denied, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001); Ostler, 2001 UT 68 (interpreting
the language of rule 11 to provide defendant with 30 days from sentencing in which to
withdraw plea); (Weeks1 Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review, Point II).
Finally, Weeks' proposed interpretation would bring Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) in
harmony with Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Lyon v. Burton. 2000 UT
19, ^[17,5 P.3d 616 (statute will be construed so that it is in harmony with other provisions).
Rule 22(e) provides that a court may correct a sentence "imposed in an illegal manner,
at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2001); State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856,859 (Utah 1995)
(holding that Rule 22(e) permits an appellate court to consider the legality of a sentence even
if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal.)
Since restitution is ordered as part of sentencing (Lipsky. 608 P.2d at 1244), Rule
22(e) would apply to those restitution amounts "imposed in an illegal manner."
By way of illustration, Weeks1 objections to restitution in the trial court related to the
way in which the award was imposed at sentencing. According to Utah case law,
"[fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant have
11

the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information
upon which his sentence is based." Gomez. 887 P.2d at 855. In addition, double hearsay
statements may not serve as the basis for a sentencing determination. Johnson. 856 P.2d at
1071; see also Howell. 707 P.2d at 118 (constitution requires judge to act on reliable,
relevant information in sentencing).
In this case, Weeks objected to the trial court's reliance on statements in the
presentence report to support the restitution award (R. 60:5-7 (judge identified statements in
presentence report as supporting the order, and defendant objected to reliance on such
statements)), and he requested the opportunity to examine and challenge the accuracy and
reliability of the factual information upon which the restitution order was based. (R. 60.) The
trial court denied Weeks' objections and requests. The trial court erred under both Rule 22(e)
and§76-3-201(4)(e).
Because the restitution sentence was imposed in an illegal manner in violation of
Gomez. 887 P.2d at 855 (defendant has right to examine and challenge accuracy of factual
information); Howell. 707 P.2d at 118 (judge must act on reliable information); and Johnson.
856 P.2d at 1071 (double hearsay may not serve as sole basis for sentencing),Weeks was
entitled to relief under both Section 76-3-201 (4)(e) and Rule 22(e).4 Since Weeks could have

4

Although Weeks filed his request in the trial court under § 76-3-20l(4)(e), this Court
may address Weeks' arguments on appeal as though he filed them under Rule 22(e). See
Brooks. 908 P.2d at 859 (appellate court may consider legality of sentence under Rule 22(e)
even if issue is raised first on appeal); see also Bair v. Axiom Design. 2001 UT 20,1fi[9-l0,
20 P.3d 388 (if the trial court has addressed the merits of an improperly labeled motion, this
Court will disregard labeling to resolve the matter as though defendant proceeded under the
12

made his request for relief under Rule 22(e) "at any time," it is only reasonable to interpret
§ 76-3-20l(4)(e) in harmony with that provision.

In that regard, Weeks1 proposed

interpretation of § 76-3-20l(4)(e) is appropriate. It would allow defendant a "reasonable
time" to object to restitution in order that the trial court may provide a "full hearing" on the
matter in connection with sentencing.
Weeks1 proposed interpretation of § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) would bring that provision in
harmony with similar provisions, with practices in the trial court, and with due process, and
it would be consistent with the plain language, which entitles defendant to a full hearing on
the matter in connection with sentencing.
C. THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO WEEKS' PROPOSED
INTERPRETATION ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE LAW.
In response to Weeks1 arguments concerning interpretation of the statute, the state
claims that a "reasonable time11 for objections after sentencing would "interject unwarranted
uncertainty and delay into the criminal process." (State's Brief at 16.) The state's claims are
misplaced for the following reasons.

proper rule of procedure); see also Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061,
1064-65 (Utah 1991) (stating that an incorrect title placed upon a pleading is not a bar to a
partyfs case on appeal); Parker. 872 P.2d at 1044 (although defendant was not entitled to have
a motion to alter or amend considered by the trial court, court of appeals would consider
substance of motion as though it had been filed pursuant to Rule 22(e) or 60(b)).
In this matter, whether Weeks filed the motion under Rule 22(e) or Section 76-3201(4)(e), he was entitled to due process in the proceedings, and accuracy and reliability at
sentencing. Indeed, Weeks specifically asked the court of appeals to rely on Rule 22(e) to
reach the merits of his claims on appeal. (See Reply Brief of Appellant, dated July 11,2000,
at 12-13; see also Weeks' Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review, at 21,28-29.) The court
of appeals refused to do so. That was error. Weeks is entitled to relief under that provision.
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First, this Court may specify that a "reasonable time11 must be within 30 days of
sentencing, to provide defendant with adequate notice of the matter and an opportunity to
investigate the need for a full hearing on restitution. See Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^|10 (Court
interprets rule to allow defendant to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea within 30 days after
judgment, since investigation after the plea may produce information affecting the validity
of that plea); see also Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^[22 (Billings, J., dissenting); ClatterbucL
700 P.2d at 1079 (although statute failed to specify standard of proof for proceedings, this
Court interposed standard resolving due process concerns); Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1008 (to
avoid due process conflicts, Court interprets sentencing statute to require trial court to
disclose presentence investigation report to defendant prior to sentencing).
Second, a "reasonable time" standard would not impose delay or uncertainty. (See
State's Brief at 12-13 (recognizing that trial courts routinely postpone or delay hearings on
restitution under current practices).) Rather, it would facilitate timeliness and resolution,
where defendants would be given an opportunity within a reasonable, specified time after the
imposition of restitution to assess whether an objection or hearing would be necessary. The
assessment may place the validity of the restitution award in question — making a hearing
necessary ~ or the assessment may justify the award making a hearing unwarranted. So long
as defendant has made his objection to the restitution award within a reasonable time and the
trial court has held a hearing in a timely manner, the issues would be resolved without delay,
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uncertainty or continued postponement.5

5

The state claims that if defendant were allowed to object to restitution within a
reasonable time of sentencing, it is unclear how the hearing on restitution "would impact the
appellate process." (State's Brief at 17-18.) The state's claim is incorrect.
Once the trial court has conducted the restitution hearing and issued an order on the
matter, defendant may appealfromthat order since all matters relating to the criminal case
are finally resolved. In Stames, 841 P.2d 712, after defendant entered a guilty plea for
criminal mischief and assault, a judgment was entered against him ordering him to pay
restitution. Defendant subsequently requested a restitution hearing, and after three hearings,
which were held between November 8,1991, and January 8,1992, defendant appealed. The
court of appeals reviewed the issues on appeal and vacated the restitution order for further
proceedings. In State v. Dominguez. 1999 UT App 343,ffi[3-5,992P.2d 995, sentence and
judgment were entered in April 1998, defendant filed an objection to restitution on or about
May 14, 1998, a restitution hearing was conducted in September 1998, and defendant
appealed from that final order. In that case, resolution of the restitution issues signaled
finality in the case. See also State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(appealing from restitution order), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994).
Restitution issues may be compared to attorneys' fees issues in civil cases. In ProMax
Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4,998 P.2d 254, plaintifffiledsuit against defendants alleging
mechanic's lien foreclosure, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. After a trial to the
bench, the court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment against plaintiff, dated
October 1, 1997. Id. at f8. On December 1, 1997, the trial court conducted a separate
hearing on the award of attorneys' fees and on February 9,1998, the court amended the fees
order. Id.at^|9. On February 13,1998, plaintifffileda notice of appeal claiming error in the
trial that resulted in the October 1, 1997 judgment. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss the
appeal as untimely. IdL at TflO. This Court denied that motion. Id. atfll.
[I]n the interest of judicial economy, a trial court must determine the amount of
attorney fees awardable to a party before the judgment becomesfinalfor the purposes
of an appeal under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. This holding will serve both
litigants and this court well, by "enabling] an appellant to appeal all issues, including
an award of attorney fees, in a single notice of appeal."
Id. at T[l5: see also Sittner v. Schriever. 2000 UT 45. TJ18-23 .2 P.3d 442 (judgment was not
appealable until issues regarding attorneys' fees were finally resolved); State v. Depaoli, 835
P.2d 162, 163-64 (Utah 1992) (considering Oregon law in interpreting Utah's restitution
statute); State v. Bonner, 771 P.2d 272, 273 (Ore. 1989) (since restitution is part of the
sentence, an order is not final for appeal until restitution issues are resolved); Utah Code
Ann. 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998 & 1999) (restitution order is part of sentencing). Once
the restitution issues are finally resolved, a notice of appeal may be filed in the matter.
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Next, the state claims that Weeks1 interpretation of the provision is not supported by
case law, while the court of appeals1 interpretation is "consistent" with "inferences" from
other cases. (State's Brief at 11.) In support of that claim, the state cites to Monson v.
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017; State v. Snvder. 747 P.2d 417,421 (Utah 1987); and Statev.Haga.
954 P.2d 1284,1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Those cases do not support the interpretation of
§ 76-3-20 l(4)(e) articulated by the court of appeals or the state in this matter.
In Monson v. Carver, the Board of Pardons held a hearing in November 1992
concerning Monson's parole, after which it issued an order granting a parole date and
requiring Monson to pay restitution in an amount to be determined. Monson, 928 P.2d at
1020-21. Monson did not object to the order and he did not request any further hearing
before the Board on the matter. Id at 1029. Approximately one year later, in November
1993, Monson filed an amended petition for extraordinary relief with a trial court, wherein
he alleged error in the Board's restitution order. Id. at 1021,1029. Monson claimed (1) the
Board failed to consider mandatory statutory factors in ordering restitution, and (2) it denied
him a "full hearing" on restitution as required by § 76-3-20l(4)(e). See ]cL at 1028-29.
This Court agreed with Monson on the first claim and remanded the case with orders
to the Board to explain its restitution order in light of mandatory statutory factors. In
connection with the remand proceedings, this Court anticipated that the Board would "no
doubt determine the [specific] amount of restitution to be ordered" in the case. Id
With respect to Monsonfs second claim, this Court ruled there was no error in the
Board's failure to provide a "full hearing" since Monson did not request a hearing and he did
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not make an objection to the Board with regard to restitution. Indeed, Monson failed to give
the Board any opportunity to consider his objections to restitution. Thus, Monson's issues
were not properly before the appellate court. See id. at 1029. That did not end the matter.
Thereafter, notwithstanding Monson's waiver of the full hearing, this Court further
ruled that if the Board specified an amount in restitution during remand proceedings and
Monson objected to the amount imposed, he would be entitled to a full hearing on the
restitution issues. Id. Its seems in Monson. defendant would be entitled to a full hearing
even where he failed to object to restitution in the original proceedings.
In State v. Snyder. 747 P.2d at 421, defendant failed to object to the order of
restitution in the trial court. On appeal, he claimed the restitution order was in error. This
Court ruled that defendant's failure to present the matter to the trial court in thefirstinstance
constituted waiver. Id. That is consistent with basic waiver principles.
Finally, in State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, the court of appeals ruled that defendant who
requested a "full hearing" was entitled to such. Id at 1289. That case did not concern the
timing of objections and therefore is not helpful to the analysis in this matter.
In sum, the state's cases do not support the court of appeals1 interpretation that § 76-3201 (4)(e) requires defendant either to object to restitution at sentencing or to waive his rights
to a full hearing. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273,1fl[9-l0. Rather, those cases simply support
the long-standing rule that the trial court must be given thefirstopportunity to correct error
before the error may be considered on appeal. Weeks has complied with that long-standing
rule. (See Weeks1 Brief of Petitioner, Point I; see also supra Point I, herein.)
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Finally, in the event this Court determines that § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) requires a defendant
to object to restitution "at the time of sentencing," the statute does not automatically close
the door to due process and a full hearing if defendant makes an objection to restitution
sometime thereafter. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(e) (provision states, trial court
"shall" provide defendant with a "full hearing" on restitution at the time of sentencing), with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4)(b) (1999) (statute species that a defendant's motion to seek
severance of the offenses "is waived" it if is not made "at least five days before trial"); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-10a-8(4) (1999) (statute specifies that a party must move to dismiss an
indictment for violation of grand jury proceedings within seven days after discovery of the
violation or such matter is "waived"). Indeed, the trial court still has discretion to entertain
the issues and to rule on the matter.
Thus, to the extent Weeks failed to object to restitution in a timely manner, Weeks'
was entitled to a "full hearing" and due process in the matter when the trial court conducted
a hearing on his objections, entertained argument, and ruled on the merits. (See Weeks' Brief
of Petitioner, Point I; see also supra Point I, herein); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).
The court of appeals' ruling is in error. It should be vacated with remand to the trial
court for further proceedings on the matter.
POINT III. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE FINDINGS
FAILS TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF
THE STATUTE AND UTAH CASE LAW ON THE MATTER.
Section 76-3-201 requires a trial court to consider certain factors before ordering
restitution in a case. Specifically, the court is required to consider (1) the financial resources
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of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose, (2) the defendant's
ability to pay restitution, (3) the rehabilitative effect of restitution on the defendant, and (4)
other circumstances. The court also is required to make a record of its reasons for restitution
in light of the statutory framework. See Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(4), (8) (Supp. 1998 &
1999); Monson. 928 P.2d at 1028 (the Board "must not only consider the four statutory
factors when it orders restitution as a condition of parole, but it must also comply with the
same procedural requirements imposed on a trial court, e.g., it shall make a record of the
reasons for its decision"; on remand, the Board must "comply with the statute by giving
Monson an explanation of its decision which demonstrates that it has taken into account the
appropriate statutory factors"); see also Miller v. State. 932 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah Ct. App.
1997); see also State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 936-37 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (the trial court
"must declare reasons within the statutoryframeworkfor awarding or denying restitution"),
reVd on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).
In State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), this Court read the relevant
statutory provisions set forth above to provide that the trial court must state the reasons for
restitution on the record in light of the specific statutory factors. This Court ruled that
"before ordering restitution, the court must take into account thefinancialresources of the
defendant." Id, at 1233 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(c)(i)). "If the court determines
that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the
reasons for the decision apart ofthe court record" Id. at 1234 (emphasis in original; citing
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i)).
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We read this requirement to mean that after taking into account the factors listed in
section 76-3-20 l(4)(c) [now subsection (8)], the trial court must take the additional
step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached,
reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute. This directive precludes the
Ramirez assumption.
In the present case, though the court explained its reasons for imposing
restitution of State Hospital costs incurred during Robertson's period of malingering,
the court did not discuss on the record the reasons for ordering restitution of
extradition costs. Because this error occurred at the sentencing stage, where costs
were imposed, we vacate the portion of the order imposing extradition costs and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings in compliance with section 76-3201(4)(d)(i).
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234.
In Weeks1 case, the state acknowledges that to the extent Robertson requires a trial
court to "make specific findings concerning the statutory factors that must be considered
under section 76-3-20 l(8)(c), the court of appeals erred in finding no error here." (State's
Brief at 25-26.)
The state then suggests that Robertson does not require such findings, and that the
above language in Robertson is dicta:
In arguing that the court of appeals' decision here conflicts with Robertson, defendant
focuses on a statement that section 76-3-201(4) requires the trial court to '"explicitly
not[e] on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the detailed
factors in the statute." Pet. Br. at 33. (emphasis added); Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234.
However, the emphasized portion of the Court's statement is dicta. Remand was
necessary under section 76-3-201 because the trial court had failed to place its reasons
for ordering restitution on the record, as required by section 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i). Id.
The Court's comment on the factors, then, was unessential to its holding.
(State's Brief at 26-27.) The state mischaracterizes the relevant language in Robertson. As
the underscored language below supports, the language was not dicta since this Court was
interpreting Utah statutory law.
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[S]ection 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i) adds, "If the court determines that restitution is
appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons
for the decision apart of the court record" Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i)
(emphasis added). We read this requirement to mean that after taking into account
the factors listed in section 76-3-201 (4) (c). the trial court must take the additional
step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached,
reflecting the detailedfactors listed in the statute. This directive precludes the use of
the Ramirez assumption.
Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234 (underscored emphasis added).
This Court's interpretation of Utah statutory law is binding on the trial court and the
court of appeals. See Litman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.. Co.. 825 F.2d 1506, 1508
(1 lth Cir. 1987) (supreme court has power to make determinations with respect to the law
ofthe jurisdiction that is binding on both trial courts and lower appellate courts), cert, denied.
484 U.S. 1006 (1988); Utah Const, art. VIII, §§ 1,2 Gudicial power rests with the supreme
court, the highest court of the state). Here, the law is plain. As set forth in the opening Brief
of Petitioner, in Weeks1 case the trial court failed to make findings on the record supporting
the reasons for restitution in light of the statutory factors. (See Weeks' Brief of Petitioner on
Certiorari Review, Point III.) That was error.
Next, the state argues that the trial court should not be held to entering findings of fact
as required under § 76-3-201 (4) and (8), Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234, and Monson. 928 P.2d
at 1028, because this Court has not interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 to require such
findings. (State's Brief at 27.) The state's argument is irrelevant. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3401 is not at issue here.
Finally, the state argues that the court of appeals correctly found that the trial court
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"put its reasons for ordering restitution on the record" when it made reference to Weeks1
criminal history (State's Briefat 27) and reference to Weeks' presentence investigation report.
(State's Brief at 28.) Those references are insufficient to support the restitution order.
As the state seems to acknowledge in its Brief of Respondent, with respect to the trial
court's reference to Weeks' criminal acts and history, that reference did not relate to
restitution. (See State's Brief of Respondent at 8; State's Brief of Appellee, dated May 12,
2000, at 8 and 18 ("although not specifically addressing its reasons for restitution," the court
"noted" defendant's criminal history).) Instead, that reference related to the fact that the
judge intended to send Weeks to prison for the crimes. (See Weeks' Brief of Petitioner on
Certiorari Review, Point III.B.) In that regard, the court of appeals' ruling is in error: the trial
court did not put its reasons for ordering restitution on the record when it made reference to
the criminal acts and history.
In addition, as set forth in the opening Brief of Petitioner, the trial court's reference
to the presentence investigation report fails to support compliance with the statute. (See
Weeks' Brief of Petitioner on Certiorari Review, at 37-41.) Thus, the trial court's ruling is
incorrect. On that basis, Weeks respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the trial
court for proper consideration of the statutory factors and findings.6

6

In its brief, the state claims Weeks has "conceded" certain portions of the state's
arguments. (See e.g., Brief of Respondent on Certiorari Review, at 10 and 12.) Those claims
should be disregarded unless Weeks has specifically and explicitly stated otherwise herein.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and as set forth in the opening Brief of Petitioner,
Weeks respectfully requests that this Court vacate the court of appeals' ruling in this matter
and remand this case to the trial court for a full hearing and proper findings on the restitution
issues.
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76-2-305

CRIMINAL CODE

or whether it is mainly the product of
some incitement or inducement by the
police; statute made no substantial
change in meaning of prior Supreme

Court rulings in regard to when entrapment occurs. State v. Hansen, 588 P. 2d
164.

76-2-305. Mental disease or defect.
Lay witness.
Court did not commit error in excluding lay witness testimony of defendant's
insanity where defendant did not mani-

fes^ a n y obvious symptoms of insanity
from which the lay witness could reliably
form a judgment. State v. Mellen, 583
P. 2d 46.

CHAPTER 3—PUNISHMENTS
Part 2—Sentencing
Section
76-3-201.
76-3-201.1.
76-3-201.2.

Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil penalties—Restitution to victim.
Nonpayment of fine or restitution as contempt—Imprisonment—Relief
where default not contempt—Collection of default.
Civil action by victim for damages.

76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil
penalties—Restitution to victim.—(1), (2) * * * [Same as parent volume.]
(3) (a) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activities
which have resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court may order that the defendant make
restitution to the victim.
(b) In determining whether to order restitution which is complete,
partial or nominal, the court shall take into account:
(i) The financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with due regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; and
(iii) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment.
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow
him a full hearing on such issue.
(4) As used in subsection (3) above:
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense with respect to which
the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct admitted by
the defendant;
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a
civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and shall include, but not be limited to, the money
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken or otherwise harmed,
and losses such as medical expenses;
2

(c) "Restitution" means full, partial or nominal payment of pecuniary damages to a victim;
(d) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities; "victim" shall not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-3-201; L. 1979, ch.
69, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1979 amendment added subsecs.
(3) and (4) relating to restitution to victim.

76-3-201.1. Nonpayment of fine or restitution as contempt—Imprisonment—Relief where default not contempt—Collection of default.
—(1) When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or to make restitution
defaults in the payment thereof or of any installment, the court on
motion of the county attorney, victim, or upon its own motion may require him to show cause why his default should not be treated as contempt of court, and may issue a show cause citation or a warrant of
arrest for his appearance.
(2) Unless the defendant shows that his default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure
on his part to make a good faith effort to make the payment, the court
may find that his default constitutes contempt and may order him
committed until the fine or the restitution, or a specified part thereof,
is paid.
(3) When a fine or an order of restitution is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association, it is the duty of the person authorized
to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation or association
to pay the fine or make the restitution from those assets, and his failure
to do so may be held to be contempt unless he makes the showing required in subsection (2) of this section.
(4) The term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment of
fines or failure to make restitution shall be set forth in the commitment order.
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default
in the payment of a fine or restitution is not contempt, the court may
enter an order allowing the defendant additional time for payment,
reducing the amount thereof or of each installment or revoking the
fine or order of restitution or the unpaid portion thereof in whole
or in part.
A default in the payment of a fine or costs or failure to make
restitution or any installment thereof may be collected by any means
authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The levy of
execution for the collection of a fine or restitution shall not discharge
a defendant committed to imprisonment for contempt until the amount
of the fine or restitution has actually been collected.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201.1, enacted
by L. 1979, ch. 69, § 2.

Title of Act.
An act amending section 76-3-201,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted
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Addendum B

UTAH HOUSE BILL NO, 6 (1979)
In the Utah House of Representatives, January 25,1979, House Bill No. 6,
Third Reading.
[Clerk: Reads Bill]
[Representative Selleniet]: Thank you. This bill is a result of an Interim Study
Committee assignment three years ago. It is based on an Oregon statute that has been
through the Governor's Blue Ribbon Task Force Committee on Criminal Justice and has
their recommendation. Basically what we're doing in the bill is broadening the
restitution program and the latitude of the courts as far as restitution goes. And that is
restitution by the criminal to his victim. Some of the things that we have in the bill is
that the court determine what the financial resources are of the victim [sic: defendant]
and his ability to pay and, what I think is most important, the rehabilitative effect on the
victim [sic: defendant]. We're preserving some due process rights where if the criminal
objects to the imposition, he may have a full hearing, and with the benefit of counsel,
state those objections and make a determination there.
We have limited this to special damages, but excluded general damages. This,
however, will still allow a victim to go into the civil courts and obtain any other
damages. We've also provided in the bill that if a criminal is sentenced as part of his
sentence with restitution and is not meeting those requirements, that the county attorney,
the victim, or the court upon them, on motion may bring him in on an order to show
cause why he shouldn't be held in contempt. We also have contempt provisions here
1

with guidelines to the court.
Rather than go in greater detail, this is pretty well the heart of the bill. I would
solicit your whole-hearted support, and I'll submit to questions if there are any at this
time. Thank you.
[Unidentified Speaker]: Anybody like to question Rep. Selleniet on his bill?
[Representative Selleniet]: I will not sum up then. Just call for the question on the
bill.
[Unidentified Speaker]: Voting will now be open on House Bill 6, as amended.
Voting is now open. Would you quickly vote.
[Bill passes.]

In the Utah Senate, February 7,1979, House Bill No. 6 Second Reading.
[Unidentified Speaker]: What I'd like to do I guess is ask the secretary of the
Senate to read both House Bill 6 and 27 so that they would both be before us, and it
would be my intention then to have a committee of the whole, and the chief sponsor of
both bills could make a brief explanation of those bills. House Bill No. 6.
[Clerk]: House Bill No. 6, Restitution by Criminals by Rep. Selleniet. [Clerk reads
bill.]
[Unidentified Speaker]: We've heard the motion to adopt the committee report.
Discussion.
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All in favor of motion, say/. [7] Opposed, no. Carried by one vote. Passes.
Representative Selleniet, (inaudible) to come to the mic, please.
[Motion to adopt the committee report.]
[Representative Selleniet]: Thank you Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen of the
Senate. Very briefly, let me say House Bill 6 is a restitution hi 11 that icquires that where
possible criminals make restitution to their victims. It's coming through the Interim
Judiciary Study and was recommended by them. It's also been reviewed by the
Governor's Blue Ribbon Task Force on Criminal Justice and has been recommended by
that study group also. House Bill 27, Defense Cost and Criminal Actions, is somewhat
related and I'll discuss the two together as has been indicated.
Currently, the courts can order restitution, but there are guidelines lacking and
what we're trying to do here is give the court certain guidelines. We're trying to broaden
it somewhat. Currently if there's a plea bargaining situation and they're only found
guilty of one offense officially, the court cannot assess restitution in those other cases.
There is a Supreme Court case in the state of Utah. We're trying to clarify that by statute
(inaudible) allowed.
There are three things that the court must consider. There's financial resources,
the ability of the criminal to pay, and the rehabilitative effect. Provisions for order to
show cause, if they don't meet the restitution requirements. As an example, the court
could order that restitution be made on monthly installments, and if they fall behind in
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the installments, either the court, the county attorney, or the victim will file an order to
show cause. There are contempt provisions in that bill. The Cost and Criminal Actions
Bill is followed from an Oregon statute which has been to United States Supreme Court.
(Inaudible) this is for. And basically what it does, is in the cases where the court has
appointed an attorney for an indigent defendant, and the court finds that that indigent
defendant can pay part of that cost back or all of that cost, in other words is not so
indigent as they may have indicated, they may assess these costs and allow the county to
recoup those costs.
The provisions there once again are that first, restitution must be the primary
consideration, that it be limited to the attorney fees and any investigator that the attorney
may have hired. Also, he cannot assess for the cost of jury trial because that's a constitutionally-guaranteed provision. He must also take into account the ability to pay, the
financial resources, the nature of the burden, and, as I indicated, restitution. There are
contempt provisions in that, also. And that basically summarizes the bills. Thank you.
[Unidentified Speaker]: Mr. President, are there any questions of Rep. Selleniet?
[Senator Halverson]: Yes, Representative Selleniet, this comes from the Interim
Study I suppose from the bill that we introduced a year ago on restitution for crimes. We
have not chosen to go far enough to really restore. Would you give me some rationale as
to why you're imposing the hardship. (Inaudible) creates the hardship. But I don't ever
see in your bill the real ability to reach a status of restitution. It's merely for process of
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forcing some payment by the criminal as his ability would allow.
[Representative Selleniet]: That's correct. The bill does not go as far as I
personally would have desired. But it is a compromised situation as it may have been the
bill we said the court "may" impose. I would like to have made that a shall Many of
the members [ot] the coiiiniittce felt that would (inaudible) impose that on thi court, hut
it does broaden considerably. Certainly if you're going to put a criminal on probation,
and as a condition of restitution, he is financially unable to make that restitution,
completely make that restitution, you wouldn't want to revoke that probation if he could
make part of it and he would make a good faith effort

We're trying to give the court

some discretion yet say that restitution should be a primary factor in probation
particularly.
Also, the parole board has indicated if the courts will impose restitution as well as
a jail sentence, when they come up for parole they will continue with that restitution in
many cases as part of the parole. It doesn't go as far as many of us would like it to do,
but it does go a great deal farther than we're currently doing Senator.
[Unidentified Speaker]: Well, without question you're to be complimented on
what you are doing, but the price tag on the bill? Would you care to comment
concerning that?
[Representative Selleniet]: Yes. That is rather erroneous. That would be based
on (inaudible) expand it considerably. In talking with the Adult Parole and Probation,
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we could keep it at the current level without a lot of interplay from them. Direct
restitution made to the victim rather than through Adult Parole and Probation and not
increase these costs. If we did direct them, and that's not my intent. If we did direct
them to act as an intermediary and do the collecting, it would certainly increase the cost.
My personal feeling is in those cases where the criminal can directly work with the
victim, that it'll have more of a rehabilitative effect, and I would prefer it to see it go in
that direction. If we aren't funded, obviously that's how they're going to have to go.
[Unidentified Speaker]: Are there other questions?
I move we resolve it committee as a whole.
All in favor of the motion, say/. Opposed, no. (Inaudible) carries we are out of
the committee of the whole. Unless there are any questions, I now move call for the
question on House Bill 6. Questions call for on House Bill 6. Any discussion.
(Inaudible) on the question shall be read for the third time.

In the Utah Senate, February 8,1979, House Bill No. 6, Third Reading.
[Clerk]: House Bill No. 6. Restitution by Criminals by Representative Selleniet.
[Unidentified Speaker]: Is there anyone here to explain the House Bill 6? We're
just about fresh out of leaders. (Inaudible) he has the highest authority on the floor, I
think.
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[Unidentified Speaker]: This was a bill that did not receive any great debate or
controversy yesterday. And I think we could proceed to vote on the bill.
[Unidentified Speaker]: The House sponsor of this bill felt that based on the vote
yesterday that it should not be controversial and suggested that we just proceed forward.
[Clerk]: Call for House Bill 6 pass. Roll call vote. (Individual voting takes
place.)
House Bill 6 on calendar final passing has received 24 /votes, no nay votes
(inaudible) received the majority. The bill passes, and will be signed by the President of
this open session, and referred to the House for their further action.
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